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How can Bourdieu help us grasp international politics today? How can the con-
cept of ‘‘field,’’ originally coined for analyzing relations within states, provide an
understanding of emerging patterns of transnational governance? I argue that
Bourdieu provides us with sophisticated analytical tools for exploring the
strength and limits of state authority—also beyond the national territory. More-
over, I claim that sovereign state interaction—diplomacy—has developed into a
metafield. If we are to understand emerging challenges to state authority, from
private companies to international organizations and global media, we need to
study everyday activities, which both reproduce and challenge the sovereign state
system as a meaningful reality. I illustrate this idea of competing articulations of
political authority by focusing on the EU’s new diplomatic service, which chal-
lenges the very idea of national diplomatic representation.
The Field of the State
A Bourdieusian reading of ‘‘the international’’ turns traditional IR theory upside
down. When neorealists claim that the international system is anarchical, Bour-
dieu insists that it is hierarchical. When the English School claims that ‘‘pariah
states and failed states’’ can be seen as being somehow outside international
society relegated to a more abstract international system ‘‘with less dense
interaction’’ (Dunne 2010:148), a Bourdieu-inspired approach argues that pro-
cesses of exclusion are intrinsic to international society. Muammar Gaddafi’s
Libya, for instance, only becomes a ‘‘pariah state’’ through interaction with the
rest of the world.
While this might sound like a constructivist argument about the social charac-
ter of international politics, Bourdieu is not an IR constructivist. Anarchy is not
what states make of it because the international is already structured. States
come with a history. The marginalization of some states, groups, or individuals
can be explained by the changing patterns of cultural and symbolic forms of
domination and the competition for power and prestige.
To Bourdieu, the particularity of the state as an organization, born by and
geared for power concentration, is not material. The specificity of the state is
not the accumulation of legitimate physical violence (as Weber would have it),
but the monopolization of legitimate symbolic violence. The state is first and
foremost ‘‘a central bank for symbolic credit,’’ which makes social division,
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privileges, and domination universally valid within a given territory and for a
given population (Bourdieu 1989). The state is special because it does not com-
pete for the definitions of, for example, legal and educational status, because it
already has pre-eminence over these areas, and it is a metafield (Chopra
2003:429). This means that the influence of the state as a reference point in
social life works not in one field only, but across all fields.
If the field of power—the field of the state—is in itself a field of struggle, it
also becomes clear that it is misleading to see the state as a homogenous or uni-
tary actor. The state itself is not a singular entity and in a very real sense is
divided among and within its various agencies and elected bodies. Moreover, as
Chopra notes, the state is incorporated in its citizens. The state, in this manner,
shapes structures of perception and cognition across the society that the state
governs. This is what Bourdieu means by the phrase ‘‘minds of state’’ (Bourdieu
1994:13) suggesting that the state exists as much an entity ‘‘outside’’ of its citi-
zens as it exists ‘‘of’’ the citizens (Chopra 2003:430).
Consequently, national representatives negotiate with different ‘‘minds of
state.’’ When German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle on March 17, 2011,
declared that Germany remained strongly opposed to NATO-led air strikes
against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces or any other military intervention in Libya,
he talked from a specific position in the German political landscape. Similarly,
when US President Barack Obama, UK Prime Minister David Cameron, and
French President Nicolas Sarkozy agreed on a military operation against Libyan
forces, they built on different symbolic power and national bureaucratic struc-
tures.
Critics might argue that this does not bring us much further than the foreign
policy analysis of Graham Allison. Recognizing the importance of bureaucratic
structures and power struggles within the state does not tell us how international
relations work. Indeed, in the meetings between states, one single state cannot
(a priori at least) structure the meaning of social interaction.
The Metafield of Diplomacy
The development of the military operation in Libya begs the question of
whether there are transnational fields that structure international relations. Or
put in Bourdieusian terms: Is there a universal currency of capital that travels
across international fields? Or is the international realm too heterogeneous to
produce any kind of shared understanding of what counts as a power
resource?
When national representatives meet, be it in multilateral and bilateral
contexts, the state is no longer the structuring and dominant field of power as is
the case in Bourdieu’s work. Rather, it is a distinct field where they meet that
structures their positions (see also Pouliot 2010). Particular struggles take place
when national representatives meet in, say, New York, Brussels, or Beijing, a
struggle that is relatively autonomous from struggles within the states.
Diplomacy, the management of sovereign state relations, I argue, has developed
into a metafield. Consequently, diplomatic interaction helps structure what goes
on in fields of e.g. global finance, war, and international law. While these fields are
developing relatively autonomously and may end up constraining states, they
usually begin and end with diplomatic negotiations. From the drafting of interna-
tional human right treaties to the formal ending of hostility at peace negotiations,
state-based diplomacy still frames what is possible. We can also examine how dis-
tinct transnational practices have developed in partial isolation from the diplo-
matic field, that is, transnational criminal networks such as the Italian-American
mafia that function symbolically in opposition to the state. Yet we may also observe
how private military companies such as XE Services are co-opted into the
328 On a Field Trip with Bourdieu
diplomatic field, as when protecting civil servants in Afghanistan. The metafield of
diplomacy, in other words, is changing as global and transnational actors develop
new networks of knowledge and authority (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010).
Diplomacy did not become a metafield overnight. The sovereign state system
is anchored in histories of prejudices, colonization, and global economic flows
(Anghie 2005). Today, diplomacy often reproduces inequality without any appar-
ent violence, that is, through symbolic violence. Existing IR theories are impli-
cated in this symbolic violence as they explicitly or implicitly help legitimize the
sovereign state system, and hence a specific form of political organization, mak-
ing concepts of ‘‘world society’’ or ‘‘empire’’ inferior to the sovereign state (see
Bigo and Walker 2007).
Why are some states seen as more powerful than others? Oft-mentioned
sources of power in IR theory are military strength, economic size, geopolitical
position as well as negotiation expertise and cultural attractiveness. All of these
proposed power sources may be exchanged into diplomatic capital. It requires
that they are accepted as valid in the field, that is, the power that comes with a
social position and affords prestige and leads to others paying attention to you.
The execution of power demands legitimacy; in order to understand how this is
achieved, one must examine the underling institutions that legitimize the power
and contribute to making a historically arbitrary social order seem inevitable and
natural.
Emerging Transnational Powers
Critics might object that my reading of diplomacy as a metafield is too con-
ventional. If diplomacy constitutes a metafield, then basically we are left with
the state. Doesn’t this make us blind us to dynamics that transcend the
nation-state? I would say no. States are not the only actors in diplomacy. The
question is how state sovereignty plays out in relation to other articulations of
authority. Today, states need to justify themselves in global media such as
CNN and Al Jazeera, while NGOs such as Amnesty International and interna-
tional authorities such as the European Court of Human Rights effectively
challenge the arguments made by governments. What makes such challenges
successful?
For Amnesty International, prospective states such as Kosovo or supranational
organizations to establish themselves as legitimate authorities, they need to pro-
duce particular perceptions and categories that have to count as valid and legiti-
mate. It is possible for NGOs and international organizations to become so
successful that they transform the dynamics of the sovereign state system. One
example is the European Union. In 2009, the EU’s Treaty of Lisbon entered into
force and a fully integrated European foreign service was created. This first
genuine transnational diplomatic body, the European External Action Service
(EEAS), comprises staff of 3,000–5,000 diplomats. They come from the European
Commission, the Council secretariat as well as staff seconded from the diplomatic
service of member states. The EEAS challenges the metacapital of the state, that
is, ability to uphold its monopoly of symbolic violence (Adler-Nissen 2011). As
Jan Gaspers writes, ‘‘this Service not only has the potential largely to determine
the EU foreign policy agenda and shape the Union’s external appearance, but it
will also increasingly pose a threat to member states’ national diplomacy’’ (Gas-
pers 2010:20).
The reference point for the EU’s diplomatic service is that of a national for-
eign service. This is not innocent. According to the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, one of the big-
gest challenges is how the EU delegations can become just as recognizable and
recognized as a national embassy:
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When you go into an embassy of a member state anywhere in the world, you
know which country you are in. How will it be that when you go in to look up
the External Action Service somewhere in the world, you’ll know that you are
with Europe? It’s that feeling of ‘‘this is what we do and this is what we do
well.’’(Ashton, quoted in O’Connor 2010:14)
Being recognized as a ‘‘true’’ diplomacy, having the symbolic power of a state-
like construction, is crucial to the success of the EEAS. The European Union is
not likely to become a recognized as a powerful foreign policy power by China,
for example, until it gains the upper hand vis-a`-vis its member states in excising
symbolic power.
The European Union, however, is not likely to replace national diplomacy.
Instead, we see a hybridization. On the one hand, national ambassadors start
recognizing the diplomatic capital of an EU diplomat. On the other hand,
the EEAS begins acknowledging the capital and resources of the 27 diplo-
matic ‘‘state nobilities.’’ Capital from national diplomatic services must be
exchanged into power in Brussels: that is, a clear exchange rate must be
established, thereby guaranteeing both national diplomatic elites and Commis-
sion officials that they will not lose market value, but keep their distinctions
and privileges when they participate in the European diplomatic experiment.
It may well be that European and national diplomacy becomes so intertwined
as practices that we should talk of a merged ‘‘European-national diplomatic
field.’’
While the state currently enjoys ontological priority, there are emerging and
rival ways of organizing political life. Ashley is therefore only partly right when
he claims that sovereignty ‘‘[i]s what one must do in order internationally to
be’’ (Ashley 1989:257). If the struggle for dominant positions within the diplo-
matic field changes, other claims to authority may challenge the symbolic power
of the state and transform the European diplomatic system. Bourdieu’s field the-
ory can help understand how.
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